We introduce a general representation of large population games in which each player's influ ence on the others is centralized and limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary. This representation significantly generalizes the class known as con gestion games in a natural way. Our main results are provably correct and efficient algorithms for computing and learning approximate Nash equi libria in this general framework.
INTRODUCTION
We introduce a compact representation for single-stage ma trix games with many players. In this representation, each player is influenced by the actions of all others, but only through a global summarization function. Each player's payoff is an arbitrary function of their own action and the value of the summarization function, which is determined by the population joint play. This representation of large population games may be exponentially more succinct that the naive matrix form, and here we prove that vast com putational savings can be realized as well. A natural ex ample of such games is voting scenarios (a special case in which the summarization function is both linear and sym metric), where each player's payoff depends only on their own vote and the outcome of the popular election, but not on the details of exactly how every citizen voted. Certain large-population financial market and auction models are also natural candidates. As discussed below, summariza tion games generalize a number of existing representations in the game theory literature, such as congestion games.
We make the natural assumption of bounded influencethat is, that no player can unilaterally induce arbitrarily large changes in the value of the summarization function.
(Voting is a simple example of bounded influence.) Un der only this assumption and a bound on the derivatives of the private individual payoff functions (both of which ap pear to be necessary), we give an algorithm for efficiently
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Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv, Israel mansour@cs.tau.ac.il computing approximate Nash equilibria, which interest ingly always outputs pure approximate equilibria. We also prove that a simple variant of distributed smoothed best response dynamics will quickly converge to (learn) an ap proximate equilibrium for any linear summarization func tion. These algorithms run in time polynomial in the num ber of players and the approximation quality parameter, and are among the few examples of provably efficient Nash computation and learning algorithms for broad classes of large-population games.
RELATED WORK
A closely related body of work is the literature on games known as congestion games (Rosenthal [1973] ) or exact potential games (Monderer and Shapley [1996] ), which are known to be equivalent. In congestion games and their gen eralizations, players compete for a central resource or re sources, and each player's payoff is a (decreasing) function of the number of players selecting the resources. An ex ample is the well-studied Santa Fe Bar problem, where pa trons of a local bar receive positive payoff if their numbers are sufficiently low, negative payoff if they exceed capac ity, and players who stay home receive 0 payoff. Single resource congestion games can be viewed as summariza tion games in which the global summarization is symmet ric -that is, dependent only on the total number of play ers selecting the resource. In the current work we allow the summarization function to be both non-symmetric and non linear, but our results can also be viewed as a contribution to the congestion game literature. While a fair amount is understood about the mathematical properties of equilibria in congestion games (such as the existence of pure equilib ria), and there has been a great deal of recent experimen tal simulation (see, for example, Greenwald et a!. [2001] ), there seems to be relatively little work providing provably efficient and correct algorithms for computing and learning equilibria.
We also view the proposed representation and algorithms as complementary to recent work on compact undirected graphical models for multi-player games (Kearns et a!.
[ 2001], Littman et al. [ 2002] , Vickrey and Koller [2002] ).
While those works emphasize large-population games in which each player is strongly influenced by a small num ber of others, the current work focuses on games in which each player is weakly influenced by all others. This is analogous to the two main cases of tractable inference in Bayesian networks, where the polytree algorithm provides an algorithm for sparse networks, and variational algo rithms yield approximate inference in dense networks with small-influence parametric CPTs.
DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
We begin with the standard definitions for multiplayer ma trix games. An n-player, two-action 1 game is defined by a set of n matrices Mi (1 � i � n), each with n in dices. The entry M;(x 1 , ... ,x n ) = Mi(x) specifies the payoff to player i when the joint action of the n players is x E { 0, 1} n Thus, each Mi has 2n entries. We shall assume all payoffs are bounded in absolute value by I.
The actions 0 and I are the pure strategies of each player, while a mixed strategy for player i is given by the proba bility Pi E [0, 1] that the player will play 0. For any joint mixed strategy, given by a product distribution p, we define the expected payoff to player i as Mi(
, where x � pindicates that each XJ is 0 with probability P J and I with probability 1 -P J .
We use P[ i : p;] to denote the vector which is the same as p except in the ith component, where the value has been changed top;. A Nash equilibrium for the game is a mixed strategy p such that for any player i, and for any value p; E [0, 1], Mi(PJ 2: Mi(P[i : p:J). (We say that pi is a best response to the rest of p.) In other words, no player can im prove their expected payoff by deviating unilaterally from a Nash equilibrium. The classic theorem of Nash [1951] states that for any game, there exists a Nash equilibrium in the space of joint mixed strategies.
We will also use a straightforward definition for approxi mate Nash equilibria. An £-Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy p such that for any player i, and for any value p; E [0, 1], Mi(PJ + £ 2: Mi(P[i : p:J). (We say that Pi is an £-best response to the rest of p.) Thus, no player can improve their expected payoff by more than £ by deviating unilaterally from an approximate Nash equilibrium.
As in Kearns et al. [200 I] , our goal is to introduce a nat ural new representation for large multiplayer games that is considerably more compact than the classical tabular form, which grows exponentially in the number of players. How ever, rather than succinctly capturing games in which each player has a small number of possibly strong "local" influ ences, our interest here is at the other extreme -where each player is influenced by all of the others in a large pop-ulation, but no single player has a dominant influence on any other.
The first element of this new representation is a population summarization function that we shall denote S ( x). As dis cussed in the introduction, a natural example might be the voting summarization function S(x) = (1/n) 2:: �=1 xi, but here we explicitly allow S to be asymmetric and non-linear. We shall assume without loss of generality that the range of Si s [0, 1] . The central idea is that in a multiplayer game in which the joint pure play is x, the payoffs to any player i will be a function of only his own action Xi, and the two values S(x[i : OJ) and S(x[i : 1]). We view these two values as summarizing for each player all that they need to know about the joint behavior in order to decide how to act.
Note that one of these two values (namely, S(x[i : xi])) is simply S(x).
A natural question is why we provide each player with the two values S(x[i : OJ) and S(x[i : 1]), rather than simply the single value S ( x). The reason is that in many natu ral cases, the single-value model may lead to situations in which players do not have sufficient global information to determine the effects of their own actions, or even compute their best responses, since the value S(x) alone may not determine the effect on S of changing Xi. As an example, suppose that s ( x) reports the fraction of players that are playing the majority value, without specifying whether the majority value is 0 or I, and that i is a player whose pay off increases with the value of S (that is, i is a consensus builder). Then for any given value of S(x), i cannot de termine whether he should change his play from Xi in or der to build greater consensus. If he is provided with both S(x[i : OJ) and S(x[i : 1]), he can directly see the im pact on S of his own actions (but not that of others), and can at least always compute his own best response to any fixed pure joint play x. We note, however, that the results we will give shall render this distinction between receiving one or both values largely a technicality, and that the reader may informally think of the players as receiving the single summarizing value S ( x).
Before moving on to the payoff functions for the individ ual players, we first discuss restrictions on S that we shall assume. Recall that our goal is to model settings in which every player's payoff may depend on every other player's move, but in a way that the influences are bounded. For a fixed summarization function S, we formally define the influence of player i by
The influence measures the greatest change player i can ever (unilaterally) effect in the summarization function. We say that the influence of S is bounded by T if Ti ::; T for all players i. In keeping with our motivation, we shall be studying the computational benefits that can arise from multiplayer games with bounded influence summarization functions. Note that since we assume the range of S is [0, 1], the influence is always bounded by I; however, if there are n players, in many natural bounded-influence set tings the maximum influence will be on the order of 1/n (as in voting), or at least some function diminishing with n. Note that even though the summarization function S has bounded influence, and thus a player's action can have only bounded effect on the payoffs to others, it can have dra matic effect on his own payoffs, since Fj and :Ff may as sume quite different values for any mixed strategy (despite the bounds on their derivatives). We feel this is a natural model for many large-population settings, where subjective (private) regret over actions may be unrelated to the (small) influence an individual has over global quantities. For in stance, a staunch democrat might personally find voting for a republican candidate quite distasteful, even though this individual action might have little or no effect on the over all election. It is their private payoff functions that makes individuals "care" about their actions in a large population where the global effects of any single player are negligible.
We shall assume throughout that the summarization func tion S and all the payoff functions Ft can be efficiently computed on any given input; formally, we will assume such a computation takes unit time. Thus, the tuple g = (S, {(F0,:Fi)}j=1), which we shall call a (large popu lation) summarization game, is a representation of an n player game that may be considerably more compact than its generic matrix representation. We say that g is a ( T, p ) summarization game if the influence of S is bounded by T, and the derivatives of all Ft are bounded by p.
Two final remarks on the definition of a summarization game are in order. First, note that the representation is entirely general: by making the summarization and pay off functions sufficiently complex, any n-player game can be represented. If S outputs enough information to recon struct its input (for example, by computing a weighted sum of its inputs, where the weight of bit Xi is 2-i ), and the payoff functions simply interpolate the values of the origina! game matrices for player i, the original game is ex actly represented. However, in such cases we will not have small influence and derivatives, and our results will natu rally degrade. It is only for bounded influence and deriva tive games, which seem to have wide applicability, that our results are interesting. Second, we note that if we view the summarization function as being defined for every in put length n (as in voting) and fixed, and the continuous payoff functions as being fixed, then summarization games naturally represent games with an arbitrarily large or grow ing number of players, and our results will shed light on computing and learning equilibria in the limit of large pop ulations.
The results in this paper describe efficient algorithms for computing and learning approximate Nash equilibria in summarization games, and provide rates of convergence as a function of summarization influence, payoff derivatives, and population size. We now turn to the technical develop ment.
COMPUTING EQUILIBRIA
The first of our two main results is an efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in bounded influence summarization games:
Theorem 1 There is an algorithm SummNash that takes as input any t > 0 and any (T, p)-summarization game g = (S, {(Fj,:Ff)}j=1) over n players, and outputs an O(t + Tp)-Nash equilibrium for Q. Furthermore, this ap proximate equilibrium will be a pure (deterministic) joint strategy. The running time ofSummNash is polynomial in n, 1/t, and p.
Before presenting the proof, let us briefly interpret the re sult. First, the accuracy parameter t is an input to the al gorithm, and thus can be made arbitrarily small at the ex pense of the polynomial dependence on 1/ t of the running time. As for the T p term in the approximation quality, it is natural to think of the derivative bound p as being a fixed constant, while the influence bound T is some diminishing function of the number of players n -that is, individuals have relatively smooth payoffs independent of population size, while their individual influence on the summarization function shrinks as the population grows. Under such cir cumstances, Theorem I yields an algorithm that will com pute arbitrarily good approximations to equilibria as the population increases.
The proof of Theorem 1 and the associated algorithm will be developed in a series of lemmas. Our first step is to approximate the continuous, bounded-derivative indi + 1)a) . We define the approximation ft to be constant over any a-interval I. Specifically, for any z E h. Fi (z) = :F i (ka). Since t�e derivative of the :F i is bounded by p, we have l:F i (z)-:F i (z)l ::; pa for all play ers i, bE {0, 1 }, and z E [0, 1]. In the sequel, we shall refer to 9 = (S, {(i�,it)};'= 1 ) as the a-approximate summa rization game for g.
We first show that the bounded derivatives of the payoff functions translates to a Lipschitz-like condition on the ap proximate payoff functions. where the first inequality comes from the approximation quality, and the second from the bound on the derivatives ���.
0
The following straightforward lemma translates the quality of approximate Nash equilibria in 9 back to the original game g.
Lemma 3 Let p be any !'-Nash equilibrium for the a approximate summarization game 9. Then pis a (2pa+'Y ) Nash equilibrium for g,
Proof:
Since pis a ?-Nash equilibrium for 9. each player i is playing a ?-best response. The rewards in g can change by at most pa for each action, which implies that the change to a new best response is at most 2pa +I'. 0
We next give a lemma that will simplify our arguments by letting us define (approximate) best responses solely in terms of the single global summarization value S(x), rather the multiple local values S(x [i : b]) for each i and b. We start with the following definition.
Definition 1 Let 9 be the a-approximate summarization game, and let p be any mixed strategy. We define for player i the single-value apparent best response in 9 as a;(p) = argmaxbE{O,l} { Ex�v[Fi (S( x ))]}.
Thus, a; (PJ is the apparent best response for i in 9 to p if i ignores the effect of his own actions on the summarization function. We now show that this apparent best response in 9 is in fact an approximate best response in 9.
Lemma 4 Let 9 be the a-approximate summarization game. Let p be any mixed strategy. Then a; (p) is a ( rp + 2pa)-best response for player ito pin 9. (that is, a; (PJ is not already a true best response to pfor i in 9), then the inequality above implies it is a ( rp+ 2pa)-best
Now note that by construction, if h is any a-interval, and
x and X' are any two pure strategies such that S(x) E Ik and S (X') E h (that is, both vectors give a value of the summarization function lying in the same a-interval), then a;(x) = a;(X'), because the approximate payoff functions :t; do not change over h. Furthermore, the action a; ( x) is an approximate best response fori in 9 by Lemma 4. In other words, in 9, we have reduced to a setting in which the (approximate) best response of all players can be viewed solely as a function of the a-interval h in which S(x) lies, and not on the details of x itself.
For any a-interval h. let us define where xis any vector such that S(x) E h. Thus, BR(h)
is the vector of (apparent) best responses of the players in 9 when the value of the summarization function falls in h.
This best response itself gives a value to the summarization function, which we define as V(h) = S(BR(h)). We can extend this definition to view V as a mapping from [ 0, 1] to [ 0, 1] (rather than from a-intervals to [ 0, 1]) by defining V(x) to be V(h), where x E h. In Figure I we provide a sample plot of a hypothetical V that we shall refer to for expository purposes.
The purpose of the definition of V is made clear by the next lemmas. The intuition is that those places where V "crosses" the diagonal line y = x are indicative of approx imate Nash equilibria. We begin with the easier case in which V crosses the diagonal during one of its constant valued horizontal segments, marked as the point A in Fig  ure 1 .
Lemma 5 Let Ik be an a-interval such that V(h) E h.
Then BR(h) is a (rp + 2pa)-Nash equilibrium for 9.
Proof: Let x = BR(h). Since V(h) = S(x) E h. every player i is playing Xi = a i (x), and thus by Lemma 4, a (Tp + 2pa)-best response to x.
D
We next examine the case where Lemma 5 does not apply. First we establish a property of the function V.
Lemma 6 If for every a-interval h. V(h) !f. h. then there exists a k such that V(h-d > ka > V(Ik)· Proof: For k = 0 we have V(Io) > 0, and for € = 1 / a-1 (the last interval) we have V(Ie) < 1. Therefore there has to be a k for which the lemma holds.
In other words, if Lemma 5 does not apply, there must be two consecutive intervals whose V-values "drop" across the diagonal. This case is illustrated in Figure 1 by the vertical dashed line containing the point B.
Then there is a pure strategy x which is a (3Tp + 6pa) Nash equilibrium in Q.
Proof: Let fi = BR(h-d and z = BR(lk). Lett be the number of indices i for which Yi f. Zi. Define the sequence of t vectors x 1 , ... , if! such that x 1 = fi, if! = z, and for every j = 1, ... 't, xi+ 1 is obtained from xi by flipping the next bit i such Yi f. Zi. Thus, in each xi, bits that have the same value in fi and z are unaltered, while bits that differ in y and z flip exactly once during the "walk" from x to z.
The intuition is that if we can find any vector on the walk which gives a value to S falling in or near the interval h, it must be an approximate Nash equilibrium, since players whose best response in this neighborhood of S-values may be strongly determined (that is, those for which Yi = Zi) are properly set throughout the walk, while the others may be set to either value (since they are nearly indifferent in this neighborhood, as evidenced by their switching approx imate best response values from h-1 to h). In Figure I , the points along the vertical line that include B conceptu ally show the different values of V during the walk. Now for eachj we define v i = S(xi). Due to the bounded influence of S, we have that lv i -vH 1 I � T for all j = 1, ... , t. This implies that for some value£, we have lvekal � T. (In Figure 1, point B corresponds to the vector xi on the walk whose V-value comes closest to ka, and thus constitutes the desired approximate Nash equilibrium.)
We now show that xi is an approximate Nash equilibrium. Consider player i, and assume that x f = 0, but that the best response fori is actually 1 (the other cases are similar). If ve E h, then xf is a (Tp+2ap)-best response by Lemma 4.
Otherwise, ve E h-1 · Since 0 = xf is the apparent best response for ka, we have
Hypothetical plot of the function V over the a-intervals I k. We view the x-axis as being both a continuum of individual points and a discrete sequence of a-intervals. V generally begins above the diagonal line y = x, and ends up below the diagonal, and thus must cross the diagonal at some point. The point labeled
A is an example of a horizontal crossing as covered by Lemma 5.
The column of points including the point labeled B is an exam ple of a vertical crossing as covered by Lemma 6. Each point in this column indicates a value of S realized on the vector "walk" discussed in the proof of Lemma 6, while the point B itself is the value of S nearest the diagonal in this walk. The analysis estab lishes that (at least) one of these two crossing cases must occur.
We now bound the difference in the reward to player i due to playing action 0 rather than 1 in response to xi, which is A description of the algorithm SummNash detailed in the above analysis is provided in Figure 2 .
Algorithm SummNash
Inputs: Ann-player ( T, p)-summarization game Q = (S, { (.:F0, .:Fl) }f=1 ), and an approximation parame ter E. We assume that S and each payoff function .:Fb are provided as black-box subroutines that cost unit computation time to call. Output: A (3Tp +E)-Nash equilibrium for Q.
I. ll +-Ej8p.
2.
For each player i = 1, ... , n, and b E { 0, 1}, construct the C>-approximate payoff functions fb: for every C>-interval Ik = [kll, (k + 1)ll), fi(z) = .:Fi(kll) for all z E h. Note that this requires 1/ll evaluations of each .:Fb.
3. Construct the mapping V by setting V(h) = S(sa(Ik)) for every ll-interval h.
(a) Let A be the set of player indices whose play is the same in BR(Ik-l) and BR(Ik)
(e) For j = 1, ... , t, let xi be obtained from xi-! by flipping the bit corresponding to the next index in B. Note that x' = BR(h). 
LEARNING IN LINEAR GAMES
In this section, we propose and analyze a distributed learn ing algorithm for the players of a game in which the sum marization function S is linear, that is, S(x) = I:�=l WiXi.
It is easily verified that in such a case that each influence T i = Wi. Our main result is that the learning algorithm con verges to an approximate Nash equilibrium for the summa rization game g. The analysis will rely heavily on the tools developed in Section 4.
The learning algorithm for each player is rather simple, and can be viewed as a variant of smoothed best response dynamics (Fudenberg and Levine [ 1999] ). First of all, if 9 = (S, {(F0, Ftl}j=1) is the original (linear) summariza tion game, each player i will instead use the a-approximate payoff functions f i described in Section 4. Note that these approximations can be computed privately by each player.
We shall use p1 to denote the joint mixed strategy of the population at time t in the learning algorithm. In our learn ing model, at each round t, the expected value of the sum marization function is broadcast to all players 2.
2In the full paper we will examine the variant in which a pure strategy xis sampled according top', and all players receive only the value S(x). The analysis and results will be similar due to large-deviation bounds.
One natural learning algorithm would call for each player i to update Pl in the direction of their apparent best response iii(P'). This apparent best response involves expectations over p', and therefore requires each player to know this distribution to compute iii(P') exactly. However, let us extend the definition of apparent best response to apply to means rather than complete distributions:
We can view iii (J.Lt) to be the approximate apparent best response for i to p' under the simplifying assumption that p' generates a distribution of S(x) that is sharply peaked near its mean value J.Lt· Before describing the learning al gorithm, we state without proof a standard large deviation bound that we shall use in the analysis, establishing that this assumption is warranted in large populations.
LemmaS Let Q (S,{( f j,ftl}j=1) be the a approximate summarization game derived from the (T, p) This lemma actually holds regardless of whether S is lin ear, but we shall only apply it to the linear case. Thus, for example, if all weights in S are bounded by some con stant C times 1 / n (C = 1 in the case of straight voting), we have 'lj; = O (p lo g (n)fy'n). Thus, as before we have improved approximations with larger populations. Note, however, that JI:7= 1 rl 2 T = maxi{r;}.
We now describe the learning algorithm, which has a learn ing rate parameter 0 < (3 < 1 and a "stopping" parameter S. We view (3 as a small fixed constant, and for the analysis will require that (3 < a. At time t, each player i updates their mixed strategy slightly in the direction of a i (J.Lt):
If we define BR(J.L) = (al (J.L) , ... , an(J.L ) ), the global vec tor update resulting from these distributed updates is p t + l = (1 -f3)P' + (3BR(J.Lt)· If 1Pl + 1 -Pll :S 8 for all i, then the learning algorithm is terminated; otherwise updates continue for all players.
We will refer to this distributed learning algorithm as SurnrnLearn(S). Note that if 8 > 0, the algorithm re quires a single additional bit of global information at each step, or the ability for players to "broadcast" if their up date was greater than S. For SurnrnLearn(O), no such mechanism is necessary, as all players continue updat ing forever. Below we shall consider both cases, because while SummLearn(O) is more decentralized and there fore more natural, we can make a slightly stronger state ment in the S > 0 case. Note that SummLearn(O) is sim ply an approximate and smoothed version of best-response dynamics (Fudenberg and Levine [1999] ) -each player simply moves their mixed strategy slightly in the direction of the best response to a sharply peaked distribution of S with the broadcast mean.
For the analysis, we begin by writing:
where we define h to be the a-interval containing J.Lt, we have used the linearity of S , and V is as defined in Sec tion 4. The above implies
In other words, as long as J.L t < V(h), the distributed updates cause the mean to increase, and as long as J.L t > V(Ik ) , they cause the mean to decrease. Viewed graphi cally in Figure 3 , the learning dynamics cause the mean to move towards the crossing points of the function V ana lyzed in Section 4. As before, there are two distinct cases of crossing. We now analyze the convergence to the cross ings.
Since (3 < a by choice, we always have IJ.Lt + l -J.Lti :S a.
This implies that we can only move to adjacent a-intervals: Figure 1 , with arrows added along the diagonal to illustrate the dynamics of SummLearn(.5). We can think of the distributed learning process as generating the move ment of the mean Jlt = S(p') along the diagonal. As indicated by the arrows, at each point Jlt, if V is above the diagonal, then the learning dynamics increase Jlt, and if V is below the diagonal they decrease Jlt. Convergence is to crossing points of V. At the point labeled C the dynamics reverse direction, and the point labeled D indicates a neighborhood where the dynamics do not reverse, but may slow down considerably, since V is near the diagonal.
Let us say that learning has converged at time T if there exists a vector p * such that for all t 2 T we have p' = p*. We first show that if learning converges, it must be to an approximate Nash equilibrium. This covers two possible outcomes of the learning dynamics: convergence to a horizontal cross ing point, or convergence to a point on a horizontal segment that comes very close to the diagonal (see Figure 3) .
Lemma 9 Suppose learning has converged at time T to p*. Then p* is an 0(¢ + pS + pa)-Nash equilibrium in 9.
Proof: Let J.L* = S( p* ) . Since the learning has con verged, we have l& i (J.L*) -p;'l ::; S for every i. By Lem mas 2 and 8, p;' must be a ( ¢ + p8 + 2pa )-best response in 9, and thus by Lemma 3, p* is a ( ¢ + pS + 4pa)-Nash equilibrium in 9. D Now for any a-interval h, we call a maximal sequence of consecutive time steps t with J.L t E h a visit to interval h. The duration of a visit is the number of steps in the visit.
Lemma 10 The duration of any visit to any a-interval h is bounded by (1/ (3) ln(1/S).
Proof: As long as J.L t E h. BR(J.Lt) is unchanged, and therefore I iff'-BR(J.Lt)lloo is reduced by a factor of 1-(3 at each step. Solving (1-f3)m ::; S form yields the desired bound. D
The next claim follows immediately from Lemma 10 and the Pigeonhole Principle.
Lemma 11 Assume that the mean JLt never visits any a interval twice. Then SummLearn( 6) converges after at most (1/a)(1/f3) ln(1/6) steps.
The following lemma handles both the case that learning never converges, and the case that some interval is visited twice.
Lemma 12 Suppose that at some time T, JLt makes a sec ond visit to some a-interval Ik. Then for all t > T', the mixed strategies p1 are all 0(1/J + pr + p6 + pa)-Nash equilibria for Q, where T' < T + (1/ (3) ln(1/ 6).
Proof: Let h be the first a-interval visited twice by /Lt. and that T is the first step of the second visit. Since (3 < a,
at time T-1 we had either /LT-1 E h -1 or /LT-1 E h+1; we assume the latter case without loss of generality. Note that that since h is the first revisited a-interval, /Lt is mono tonically increasing while /Lt E h, and monotonically de creasing while JLt E h+1. Thus, for all t > T, we will have JLt E h U h+1·
Consider a player i such that iii(h) = iii(h+ll· After at most (1/ (3) ln(1/6) time steps we will have I P/ -iii(h) I ::; 6. Therefore, as in the proof of Lemma 9, by time T' player i will play an 0( 1/J + pa + p6)-best response in g for all t > T. For the other playersj such thatiij(h) 'I ii j (h+ J ), any action is an 0(1/J + pr + pa)-best response for all t > T, since JLtEhUlk+1· 0
For the case 6 > 0, we thus have the following theorem, which together with Theorem 15 below constitutes the sec ond of our main results.
Theorem 13 After at most 0((1/a)(1/ (3) log(1/6)) steps, SummLearn(6) plays an 0(1/J + pr + p6 + pa)-Nash equi librium for all subsequent time steps.
As in algorithm SummNash, we can make the term p6 + pa smaller than any desired£ by choosing 6 = £j2p and a = £j2p, with the resulting polynomial dependence on 1/£ in the running time. This leaves us with the un controllable term 1/J + pr. Again, as we have discussed, in many reasonable large-population games we expect these influence terms to vanish as n becomes large. Also, note that given that we require the learning rate (3 < a, there is no benefit to setting (3 much smaller than this, and thus the choice (3 = a/2 yields an overall convergence time of 0((1/a 2 ) log(1/6)).
We now analyze SummLearn(O). Here we cannot expect to upper bound the time it will take to converge to an ap proximate Nash equilibrium -technically, if the interval h is such that IV (h) -ak I ::; 6, /Lt might stay in h for 0(log 1/6) steps (see Figure 3) . Since 6 can be arbitrary small, this time cannot be bounded. However, we can show that any time JLt is "near the diagonal", the players are play ing an approximate Nash equilibrium. This implies that we can bound the number of time steps in which they are not playing an approximate Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 14 Consider a visit of JLt to interval h in the time interval t E {t1, ... , t 2 }. For all times t E {t1 + (1/f3)ln(l/6), ... ,t 2 } p1 is an (1/J + p6)-Nash equilibrium.
Proof: As in Lemma 9, after (1/ (3) ln(l/6) steps we have IIP1-ii(JLt)lloo ::; 6. Therefore each player is playing a 0( 1/J + pa + p6)-best response in g. for an infinite sequence of steps, the players play an 0(1/J + pr + p6 + pa)-Nash equilibrium in all but at most 0((1/a 2 ) ln(l/6)) steps.
Note that though SummLearn(O) has no dependence on 6
(only the global summarization mean must be broadcast), Theorem 15 provides a spectrum of statements about this algorithm parameterized by 6-as we reduce 6, we give worse (larger) bounds on the total number of steps that a better approximation to equilibrium is played.
